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Abstract
Background: To determine which approach to assessment of evidence in data - statistical tests or likelihood ratios -
comes closest to the interpretation of evidence by untrained medical students.
Methods: Empirical study of medical students (N = 842), untrained in statistical inference or in the interpretation of
diagnostic tests. They were asked to interpret a hypothetical diagnostic test, presented in four versions that
differed in the distributions of test scores in diseased and non-diseased populations. Each student received only
one version. The intuitive application of the statistical test approach would lead to rejecting the null hypothesis of
no disease in version A, and to accepting the null in version B. Application of the likelihood ratio approach led to
opposite conclusions - against the disease in A, and in favour of disease in B. Version C tested the importance of
the p-value (A: 0.04 versus C: 0.08) and version D the importance of the likelihood ratio (C: 1/4 versus D: 1/8).
Results: In version A, 7.5% concluded that the result was in favour of disease (compatible with p value), 43.6%
ruled against the disease (compatible with likelihood ratio), and 48.9% were undecided. In version B, 69.0% were in
favour of disease (compatible with likelihood ratio), 4.5% against (compatible with p value), and 26.5% undecided.
Increasing the p value from 0.04 to 0.08 did not change the results. The change in the likelihood ratio from 1/4 to
1/8 increased the proportion of non-committed responses.
Conclusions: Most untrained medical students appear to interpret evidence from data in a manner that is
compatible with the use of likelihood ratios.
Background
Despite the advent of evidence-based medicine, asses-
sing “evidence” in data is no easy task. Doctors are con-
fronted with evidence in two situations: when
interpreting the results of laboratory tests during patient
care, and when interpreting statistical tests reported in
scientific articles. These situations are similar in many
ways. In both situations one wants to infer the true state
of things (Does the patient have the disease or not? Is
the scientific hypothesis true or false?) from an observed
result (a positive or negative diagnostic test, a statistical
test that is significant or not) [1].
Two approaches to statistical inference currently coex-
ist: statistical tests and likelihood ratios. The statistical
test approach considers the probability of the observed
result, and of more extreme results, under the null
hypothesis - i.e., the p value. If the p-value is large the
observation is considered compatible with the null
hypothesis. If the p-value iss m a l l ,t h et e s ti sd e e m e d
“significant” and the null hypothesis is rejected (we
describe here a common conflation of the Neyman-
Pearson test theory, which considers only the rejection
or acceptance of the null hypothesis, and Fisher’su s eo f
the p value, which is seen as inversely related to the
strength of evidence against the null hypothesis). The
alternate hypothesis is a passive bystander in this analy-
sis; it is selected by default when the null hypothesis is
rejected.
In contrast, the likelihood ratio approach relies on the
direct comparison of the probabilities (or probability
densities) of the observed result under two hypotheses
[2-6]. The hypothesis under which the result is the
more likely is considered supported by the data, and the
strength of support is given by the ratio of the probabil-
ities (the likelihood ratio). The key difference with a sta-
tistical test is that two distributions must be compared.
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realm of diagnostic tests. While p values are not used in
this context, the traditional interpretation is based on
the consideration of error probabilities under the
hypotheses of presence of disease (1-sensitivity, type 2
error) and absence of disease (1-specificity, type 1
error). Also, many laboratory tests come with an interval
of “normal values” that is conceptually similar to the
acceptance region of a statistical test. The likelihood
ratio is increasingly used in the interpretation of diag-
nostic tests [2].
What approach to inference is better is currently
debated. P-values have come under fire [7-13], and the
use of likelihood ratios has gained support, particularly
among methodologists [5-7]. Neither method has been
endorsed by the medical community; available evidence
suggests that many doctors are unable to interpret p-
values correctly [14] or to use likelihood ratios [15].
Missing from this debate is the examination of how peo-
ple with no knowledge of statistical inference interpret
the world around them. This is important for two rea-
sons. Firstly, the inference method should conform to
common sense, or else it will be misused or misinter-
preted. Secondly, humans have evolved over millennia
the basic tools for decision-making in a complex world,
sometimes called heuristics [16], that are simple yet reli-
able in everyday situations - thus an intuitive approach
to interpretation of data comes with a Darwinian seal of
approval. Little is known about the intuitive assessment
of evidence by untrained people.
This study examined which approach to the assess-
ment of evidence in data - statistical tests or likelihood
ratios - was more compatible with the interpretation of
data by first year medical students, who were asked to
d r a wi n f e r e n c e sf r o mad i a g n o s t i cs c e n a r i o .S i n c et h e s e
students have not been trained, either in statistics or in
the interpretation of clinical data, their answers may
capture the natural data interpretation strategy of the
human mind.
Methods
Three cohorts of first year medical students at the
School of Medicine, University of Geneva, were invited
to complete a questionnaire during the first class of the
course “Statistics for doctors”, in 2005, 2009 and 2010,
before any teaching occurred. The questionnaire
included several scenarios involving the interpretation of
data. The diagnostic scenario analyzed here was pro-
duced in 4 versions: versions A and B were tested in
2005 and 2009, and versions C and D in 2010. The 2
versions of a given year were distributed in a haphazard
way: the two types of questionnaires were shuffled,
much like a deck of cards, and handed out in small
packets across the auditorium. Students were not
informed that there were 2 versions. They were asked to
select answers that appeared the most suitable. The
questionnaire was anonymous.
The diagnostic scenario described a patient with a sus-
pected disease who is administered a diagnostic test
(Table 1). The scenario was accompanied by a table of
frequency distributions of diseased and non-diseased
individuals across values of the test. This table differed
for the four versions of the questionnaire. The respon-
dent was asked whether the test result was an argument
for the disease, against the disease, or neither for nor
against. The latter group were also labelled “non-
committed respondents”. Respondents were also asked
to rate the strength of evidence, from very strong to nil,
on a five point scale.
In version A, the patient’s test value was reported for
4% of non-diseased individuals and 1% of diseased indi-
viduals. This corresponds to a likelihood ratio of 4 in
Table 1 Diagnostic dilemma submitted to 1
st year medical students
You are on call at the emergency room. A patient arrives, Mr. Fender, who aches all over. You suspect, among other diseases, an acute ravepartitis.
You know that the Hendrix test can orient you as to the presence of this disease. This test consists in having the patient listen to “Star spangled
banner” played by Jimi Hendrix at Woodstock in 1969, at 100 dB, and in counting the number of seconds until the patient screams and covers his/
her ears. Large studies, based on thousands of observations, have shown that people who have and have not this disease are distributed as follows,
according to the Hendrix test (only one version shown):
Version A Version B Version C Version D
Hendrix test
(seconds)
Ravepartitis
absent (%)
Ravepartitis
present (%)
Ravepartitis
absent (%)
Ravepartitis
present (%)
Ravepartitis
absent (%)
Ravepartitis
present (%)
Ravepartitis
absent (%)
Ravepartitis
present (%)
0-10 0 87 0 15 1 87 0 87
11-20 0 11 3 40 3 11 0 11
21-30 4 1 8 32 4181
31-60 21 1 36 11 21 1 36 1
61 or more 75 0 53 2 71 0 56 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
You administer this test to Mr. Fender who starts to scream after 25 seconds. Is this result an argument for or against the diagnosis of ravepartitis? For/Against/
Neither for nor against
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observed or more extreme results under the null
hypothesis of no disease was 0.04, which would lead to
rejection of this hypothesis at the usual threshold of
<0.05. Thus if one applies the likelihood ratio approach,
t h et e s tr e s u l ta r g u e sagainst the presence of disease,
and if one applies the statistical test approach, the test
result leads to rejection of the null hypothesis of no dis-
ease, i.e., evidence for the presence of disease.
In version B, the test value was reported for 8% of
non-diseased individuals, and 32% of diseased indivi-
duals. This too corresponds to a likelihood ratio of 4,
but this time in favour of the presence of the disease.
The probability of the observed or more extreme results
under the null hypothesis of no disease was 11% (i.e.,
the sum of observed and more extreme probabilities:
0.08, 0.03 and 0.00, which corresponds to a one sided
p = 0.11), a non-significant result. Students who applied
the likelihood ratio approach would interpret the test
result as evidence for the disease, whereas those who
applied the statistical test approach would fail to reject
the null hypothesis, evidence against the disease.
Version C was based on version A, but with the p-
value increased to 0.08 (i.e., the sum of observed and
more extreme probabilities: 0.04, 0.03 and 0.01). The
purpose was to see if a non-significant result by usual
criteria would increase the proportion of respondents
who found that the test result favoured no disease. Ver-
sion D was based on version C, but with the likelihood
ratio strengthened to 1/8 (from 1/4). The purpose was
to see if a steeper ratio would increase the proportion of
respondents who found that the test result favoured no
disease.
We cross-tabulated the responses by type of scenario,
comparing proportions of opinions that were compatible
with the likelihood ratio approach, the statistical test
approach, and the non-committed answers. The distri-
butions were compared using a chi-square test. We
repeated these analyses after exclusion of the non-com-
mitted respondents. We compared versions A vs. B, A
vs. C, and C vs. D. We performed the same comparisons
for the ratings of strength of evidence, restricting this
analysis to the respondents who gave the majority
opinion.
Results
In total, 847 students returned their questionnaire: 282
in version A, 246 in version B, 166 in version C, and
163 in version D. This corresponds to about 80% of the
number of students enrolled. Among the respondents
were 556 (65.7%) women and 290 men (34.3%, 1 miss-
ing), and 794 (94.2%) were 18-23 years old (4 missing).
A majority (590, 69.7%) had taken an advanced mathe-
matics and science option for their baccalaureate, at age
18 or 19. The amount of previous statistics courses was
>10 hours for 234 (27.6%) students, 1-9 hours for 203
(24.0%), and none for 410 (48.4).
Versions A and B implied opposite interpretations of
the test according to the underlying approach to infer-
ence, either statistical test or likelihood ratio. In version
A the statistical test approach was in favour of the disease
and the likelihood ratio approach against, and in version
B the pattern was opposite. In both cases (Table 2), more
respondents answered according to the likelihood ratio
approach (A: 43.6%, B: 69.0%) than the statistical test
approach (A: 7.5%, B: 4.5%). Among those with a stated
opinion (either for or against disease), the proportion
who responded in a way that was compatible with the
likelihood ratio approach was somewhat lower for ver-
sion A than version B (85.3% vs. 93.9%, p = 0.014). A
fairly high proportion of respondents did not express an
opinion about the meaning of the test result, and this
proportion of non-committed respondents was higher for
version A than B. Among respondents who gave the
majority opinion (against disease in version A, for in ver-
sion B), the distribution of strength of evidence was
shifted to lower ratings for version A than for version B.
Version C differed from version A only in that the p-
value changed from 0.04 to 0.08. Since the latter value
would be considered non-significant by most people
who apply statistical tests, fewer such respondents
should rule in favour of disease under C than under A.
In contrast, the likelihood ratio was identical in A and
C. There were no statistically significant differences
between scenario A and C (Table 2).
Version D differed from version C only in the likeli-
hood ratio, while the p value was held constant. The
only notable difference was that more respondents were
uncommitted when the likelihood ratio was stronger,
which ran against expectations. The proportions who
ruled against the disease among those with a clear opi-
nion were similar for C and D, and the ratings of
strength of evidence were similar as well.
Discussion
The majority of first year medical students appeared to
interpret evidence provided by a clinical test by compar-
ing probabilities in a way that is compatible with the
likelihood ratio approach to inference. In contrast, only
a minority gave answers that were consistent with the
statistical test approach. This suggests that the compari-
son of likelihoods may be more intuitive and easier to
understand and to apply than statistical testing. Others
have argued that doctors use a form of Bayesian reason-
ing in establishing a diagnosis [17]. Our results may also
explain why many doctors, and several noted statisti-
cians, have difficulty accepting the logic behind statisti-
cal tests as measures of evidence.
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values as measures of evidence has been their proble-
matic logic. In the words of Harold Jeffreys [18]: “Ih a v e
always considered the arguments for the use of P values
absurd. They amount to saying that a hypothesis that
may or may not be true [...] has not predicted something
that has not happened.” Other statisticians have noted
that “the argument seems to be basically illogical” [8],
have complained about the “convoluted reasoning neces-
sary to interpret a P-value” [10], and have lamented
“why do we turn probability logic on its head in this
way?” [11]. These difficulties contrast with the simplicity
of the likelihood ratio: if the observed result is more
likely under hypothesis A than under hypothesis B, it
argues in favour of A over B.
While most modern commentators find fault with sta-
tistical tests as measures of evidence, this criticism is
not universal [19]. More importantly, statistical tests
remain ubiquitous in published statistical analyses [13].
Either the arguments against tests are not compelling,
or the medical research enterprise has such inertia that
changing the way statistical analysis is conducted is very
difficult.
Our results describe assessments of evidence by
untrained respondents, they do not support or contra-
dict any theory of inference. A scientific theory that
contradicts intuitive reasoning is not necessarily incor-
rect. E.g., the theory of relativity leads to counter-intui-
tive statements about time and space yet is considered
accurate. Furthermore, psychologists have described
many examples where informal thought processes can
be in error [20]. However, informal thought processes
are correct most of the time when applied in familiar
situations, and inferring how the world works from
observations is a familiar task. Therefore the lack of
endorsement by medical students of the statistical test
approach to inference raises a red flag about this infer-
ence method.
Notably, students as a group did not apply the likeli-
hood ratio approach by the book. Firstly, they did not
interpret in the same way 2 situations characterized by
the same likelihood ratio, if inversed (versions A and B).
The evidence provided by probabilities of 32% versus
8% appeared to be more compelling than evidence
based on 4% versus 1%. Possibly, the absolute difference
between the probabilities influenced the interpretation
of the data, and not merely their ratio. This is contrary
to the law of likelihood, which states that the likelihood
ratio captures all the information there is about the rela-
tive plausibility of the competing hypotheses. Secondly,
version A (4% versus 1%) was characterized by a higher
proportion of non-committed respondents than version
B (32% versus 8%). It is possible that the students
looked at the whole distributions of diseased and non-
diseased individuals, noted that the observed result fell
in-between the two modes, in a grey zone, and con-
cluded that this was an indeterminate result. If so, they
would have considered the probability of events that
had not happened, in Jeffreys’ words. It is even possible
that some may have performed statistical tests of both
Table 2 Version characteristics, distributions of student responses, and comparisons of versions of the scenario
Version A Version B Version C Version D A vs. B A vs C C vs. D
P value (H0: absence of disease) 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.08
Evidence from p value favours Disease No disease No disease No disease
Likelihood ratio (LR) in favour of disease 0.25 4 0.25 0.125
Evidence from LR favours No disease Disease No disease No disease
Interpretation of result: p < 0.001 p = 0.34 p = 0.020
For 21 (7.5) 169 (69.0) 9 (5.5) 5 (3.3)
Against 122 (43.6) 11 (4.5) 83 (50.3) 56 (36.8)
Neither for nor against 137 (48.9) 65 (26.5) 73 (44.2) 91 (59.9)
Interpreted the result as for or against disease 143 (51.1) 180 (73.5) 92 (55.8) 61 (40.1) p < 0.001 p = 0.34 p = 0.005
Interpretation excluding the undecided p < 0.001 p = 0.27 p = 0.74
For 21 (14.7) 169 (93.9) 9 (9.8) 5 (8.2)
Against 122 (85.3) 11 (6.1) 83 (90.2) 56 (91.8)
Strength of evidence among majority opinion (N = 122) (N = 169) (N = 83) (N = 56) P < 0.001
linear trend
p = 0.43
linear trend
p = 0.58
linear trend
Very strong 5 (4.1) 2 (1.2) 1 (1.2) 3 (5.4)
Strong 22 (18.0) 54 (32.0) 13 (15.7) 12 (21.4)
Moderate 39 (32.0) 95 (56.2) 28 (33.7) 12 (21.4)
Weak 51 (41.8) 17 (10.1) 39 (47.0) 26 (46.4)
Absent 5 (4.1) 1 (0.6) 2 (2.4) 3 (5.4)
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likelihood ratio that was twice as large (1/8 versus 1/4
in scenarios D and C) was not interpreted as stronger
evidence for the more likely hypothesis; disturbingly, the
proportion of undecided responses was greater for the
more contrasted likelihood ratio. For these reasons, we
cannot take our results as an endorsement of the likeli-
hood ratio as a measure of evidence in data. Others too
have observed that students do not apply Bayes’ theo-
rem when interpreting test results [21].
A minority of students did respond as though they
applied the statistical test approach to inference.
Furthermore, it is in principle possible to test any
hypothesis, not just the null. If some students tested the
hypothesis of “presence of disease”,t h e yw o u l dh a v e
concluded similarly to those who applied the likelihood
ratio approach. This issue illustrates a key limitation of
this study, namely the lack of a direct description of the
respondents’ thought process in interpreting the data.
We only assessed the end product of the respondents’
reasoning, which may have been reached by a variety of
considerations. Qualitative studies may be necessary to
better understand how students interpret data.
An unexpected result was the high proportion of non-
committed respondents, in all versions of the scenario.
This may simply reflect a lack of familiarity with the
task on the students’ part. Alternatively, it may reflect
t h ef a c tt h a tt h eo b s e r v e dr e s u l tw a sn o tv e r yc o m p e l -
ling, by either approach. P-values of 0.04 or 0.08 are
uncomfortably close to the conventional significance
limit of 0.05; a likelihood ratio of 4 or 1/4 can be con-
sidered as weak evidence [2,3]. But assessment problems
may also have contributed to the high proportion of
non-committed answers. E.g., it is possible that some
respondents have not understood the problem state-
m e n t ,o rt h a ts o m em a yh a v ef o u n di te x p e d i e n tt o
answer the equivalent of “Id o n ’tk n o w ” instead of
reflecting on the data at hand. The scenarios we have
used had not been tested with regard to their reliability
and validity. This casts some doubt on the results pre-
sented in this paper. However, we believe that the con-
trasts between the versions of the scenario are such that
measurement error is not a likely explanation of the
main findings.
Another limitation of this study is that we asked a
very narrow question (Is this result an argument for or
against the diagnosis of ravepartitis), which may be
unrealistic. In real life, doctors integrate the pre-test
probability of disease with the test result in order to
arrive at a post-test probability. This can be done
through the application of the Bayes theorem, which
few doctors are capable of doing [15], or by using nat-
ural frequencies, an easier and less error-prone method
[22]. Our results suggest that the idea of comparing
distributions under competing hypotheses has intuitive
appeal, but do not guarantee that the correct interpreta-
tion of test results is easy or intuitive.
We should also acknowledge that the application of
the likelihood ratio approach in research may prove
challenging in some situations. One issue is the choice
of an appropriate pair of hypotheses. Others are the lack
of adequate statistical software, and the inertia of gen-
erations of medical researchers trained to do statistical
tests. To bring home these arguments, even though we
find the likelihood ratio approach conceptually appeal-
ing, we obtained P-values for the comparisons of groups
of respondents in this study.
Conclusions
In aggregate, these results suggest that untrained stu-
dents might interpret data through a comparison of like-
lihoods, possibly by considering likelihood ratios.
Promoting the use of likelihood ratios to communicate
clinical or scientific results may facilitate the interpreta-
tion of evidence by doctors.
Authors’ contributions
TP proposed the initial study, analysed the results, wrote the paper. DC
participated in the extensions to the initial protocol and in the interpretation
of the results, and revised the paper. Both authors read and approved the
submitted manuscript.
Authors’ information
Both authors teach statistical methods and clinical research methods to
medical students, and both act as methods experts on clinical research
projects
Funding: none
Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 1 June 2010 Accepted: 26 August 2010
Published: 26 August 2010
References
1. Browner WS, Newman TB: Are all significant p values created equal? The
analogy between diagnostic tests and clinical research. JAMA 1987,
257:2459-63.
2. Grimes DA, Schulz KF: Refining clinical diagnosis with likelihood ratios.
Lancet 2005, 365:1500-5.
3. Jaeschke R, Guyatt GH, Sackett DL, for the Evidence-Based Medicine
Working Group: Users guides to the medical literature. VI: How to use an
article about a diagnostic test. A: Are the results of the study valid?
JAMA 1994, 271:703-7.
4. Spiegelhalter DJ, Myles JP, Jones DR, Abrams KR: An introduction to
bayesian methods in health technology assessment. BMJ 1999,
319:508-12.
5. Goodman SN: Toward evidence-based medical statistics, 2: the Bayes
factor. Ann Intern Med 1999, 130:1005-13.
6. Edwards AWF: Likelihood. Expanded edition Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins
University Press 1992.
7. Royall R: Statistical Evidence - A Likelihood Paradigm London: Champan &
Hall 1997.
8. Goodman SN: Toward evidence-based medical statistics, 1: the P value
fallacy. Ann Intern Med 1999, 130:995-1004.
9. Berkson J: Tests of significance considered as evidence. J Am Stat Assoc
1942, 37:325-35.
Perneger and Courvoisier BMC Medical Research Methodology 2010, 10:78
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/10/78
Page 5 of 610. Sterne JAC, Davey Smith G: Sifting the evidence - what’s wrong with
significance tests? BMJ 2001, 322:226-31.
11. Berger JO, Berry DA: Statistical analysis and the illusion of objectivity. Am
Scientist 1988, 76:159-165.
12. Poole C: Low P-values or narrow confidence intervals: which are more
durable? Epidemiology 2001, 12:291-4.
13. Silva-Aycaguer LC, Suarez-Gil P, Fernandez-Somoano A: The null hypothesis
significance test in health sciences research (1995-2006): statistical
analysis and interpretation. BMC Med Res Methodol 2010, 10:44.
14. Windish DM, Huot SJ, Green ML: Medicine residents’ understanding of
the biostatistics and results in the medical literature. JAMA 2007,
298:1010-22.
15. Estellat C, Faisy C, Colombet I, Chatellier G, Burnand B, Durieux P: French
academic physicians had a poor knowledge of terms used in clinical
epidemiology. J Clin Epidemiol 2006, 59:1009-14.
16. Marewski JN, Gaissmaier W, Gigerenzer G: Good judgments do not require
complex cognition. Cogn Process 2010, 11:103-21.
17. Gill CJ, Sabin L, Schmid CH: Why clinicians are natural Bayesians. BMJ
2005, 330:1080-3.
18. Jeffreys H: Some general points in probability theory. In Bayesian Analysis
in Econometrics and Statistics. Edited by: Zellner A. Amsterdam: North
Holland; 1980:451-4.
19. Weinberg CR: It’s time to rehabilitate the P-value. Epidemiology 2001,
12:288-90.
20. Kahneman D, Slovic P, Tversky A: Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press 1982.
21. Nogushi Y, Matsui K, Imura H, Kiyota M, Fukui T: Quantitative evaluation of
the diagnostic thinking process in medical students. J Gen Intern Med
2002, 17:848-853.
22. Hoffrage U, Gigerenzer G: Using natural frequencies to improve
diagnostic inferences. Acad Med 1998, 73:538-40.
Pre-publication history
The pre-publication history for this paper can be accessed here:
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/10/78/prepub
doi:10.1186/1471-2288-10-78
Cite this article as: Perneger and Courvoisier: Interpretation of evidence
in data by untrained medical students: a scenario-based study. BMC
Medical Research Methodology 2010 10:78.
Submit your next manuscript to BioMed Central
and take full advantage of: 
• Convenient online submission
• Thorough peer review
• No space constraints or color ﬁgure charges
• Immediate publication on acceptance
• Inclusion in PubMed, CAS, Scopus and Google Scholar
• Research which is freely available for redistribution
Submit your manuscript at 
www.biomedcentral.com/submit
Perneger and Courvoisier BMC Medical Research Methodology 2010, 10:78
http://www.biomedcentral.com/1471-2288/10/78
Page 6 of 6